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ABSTRACT 
  
The selection of immigrants by skill and education is a central issue in the analysis of 
immigration. Since highly educated immigrants tend to be more successful in host 
country labour markets and less of a fiscal cost it is important to know what determines 
the skill-selectivity of immigration. In this paper we examine the proportions of highly 
educated among migrants from more than 70 source countries who were observed as 
immigrants in each of 21 OECD countries in 2000/1.  We develop a variant of the Roy 
model to estimate the determinants of educational selectivity by source and destination 
country. Two key findings emerge. One is that the effects of the skill premium, which is 
at the core of the Roy model, can be observed only after we take account of poverty 
constraints operating in source countries. The other is that cultural similarities, colonial 
legacies and physical distance are often more important determinants of the proportion of 
high-educated immigrants from a source country to an OECD destination than wage 
incentives or selective immigration policy.  
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Introduction 
In this paper we examine, and attempt to explain, the selection of immigrants by 
education to OECD countries from a wide range of source countries. The immigration 
literature has been much concerned with the mechanisms involved in immigrant 
selection, including economic incentives, immigration policy barriers and constraints 
operating in source countries. The debate has been fuelled by concerns about the 
performance of immigrants in developed country labour markets and the general finding 
that the higher are the skills of immigrants, the higher are their earnings and employment 
probabilities, the more positive is their net fiscal contribution, and the more positive is 
public opinion towards them and towards immigration more generally (Boeri, 2010). Not 
surprisingly a number of leading immigration countries have moved towards greater skill 
selection in their immigration policies.  
These trends have been accompanied by renewed interest in the ‘brain drain’. The 
gradual increase in migration from poor to rich countries, together with trends in skill-
selective immigration policy, have given rise to concerns that some of the poorest 
countries are being disadvantaged as their best and brightest leave to seek employment in 
high-wage OECD countries. A series of important studies have focused on whether the 
process of high-skilled emigration improves education incentives in poor countries 
(Beine at al. 2001; 2008; Docquier et al., 2007; Docquier and Rapoport, 2009). They find 
positive effects on the share educated (migrants plus non-migrants) although some small, 
poor countries with high emigration still suffer a net loss of human capital. Another 
literature has examined the effects of the size and composition of diasporas on 
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development through generating remittances and creating trade as well as through return 
migration and technological transfer (Özden and Schiff (eds.) 2006).  
Here we focus on what explains the educational selectivity of out-migration 
across source countries and what combination of incentives and policy determines the 
skill content of immigration among the main destinations. The basic framework used in 
models of skill selection is the Roy model (Roy, 1951), which was introduced to the 
literature on international migration in a series of influential papers by Borjas (1987, 
1994, 1999). The essence of the Roy model is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the 
destination and origin wage-by-skill schedules (assumed to be in present values) facing 
potential emigrants. In this illustration, the destination wage schedule, w(y), is increasing 
in the individual’s skill or education level with a slope that reflects the return to 
education. If the wage schedule in the origin country is w(x)1, the return to education is 
lower in the origin than at the destination. Only those with an education level exceeding 
s1 will have an incentive to migrate and hence there will be positive selection. By contrast 
if the origin wage schedule is w(x)2 then only those with education below s2 will emigrate 
and there will be negative selection.  
 The position of the home country reservation wage schedule w(x) depends on a 
number of other factors that can be considered as costs. One is the individual’s preference 
for (or compensating differential in favour of) the home country, which may differ across 
individuals thereby introducing greater heterogeneity into selection by skill. A second 
component is the direct cost of migration, which also displaces w(x) upwards and may 
vary by skill level. A third is the cost associated with gaining admission through the 
policy filter, which could also vary across individuals and by skill level. Finally, some 
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individuals may be constrained from migrating by poverty, an issue to which we return 
below. Two points follow from this analysis. One is that even if the wage schedule in 
country y lies everywhere above the wage schedule in x (country x is much poorer) the 
other components may still ensure that the reservation wage schedule crosses the 
destination wage schedule. Thus selection can still be important even when income gaps 
are large. The second point is that these other components may influence the slope of the 
reservation wage schedule w(x) so that the relative slopes of the ‘raw’ (or unadjusted) 
wage schedules may not be a good guide to the skill-selectivity of migration from x to y.  
 In his studies using this framework Borjas (1987, 1992, 1994, 1999) finds that the 
adjusted wage differential for recent immigrants to the US depends negatively on source 
country inequality and positively on average source country income, which implies that 
immigrants from poor and unequal countries are negatively selected relative to 
immigrants from other source countries. Comparison between the US and Canada 
suggests that skill-selective immigration policies might be important, although 
differences in immigrant skills are driven mainly by source country composition rather 
than by differences in the selectivity of migrants from a given source country (Borjas 
1993; Antecol et al., 2003). However, migrants to the US from Puerto Rico are less 
educated than non-migrants and the inflow to Puerto Rico is more educated than the 
source population (Ramos. 1992; Borjas, 2008). This is consistent with higher returns to 
education in Puerto Rico as compared with the US, in the absence of immigration policy 
barriers between the two countries. In a study of 32 source countries Feliciano (2005) 
finds that Puerto Rico is the only country for which migrants to the US are negatively 
selected on education relative to the source population. This suggests that the presence of 
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immigration policy increases positive selection, although there is still a weak negative 
relationship between the degree of positive selection and source country inequality.1    
Much of the recent attention has focused on the large flow across the southern US 
border from Mexico, a much poorer country with a higher return to skills. Estimating the 
wage distribution for migrants had they stayed in Mexico, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) 
find that migrants are drawn disproportionately from the middle and upper middle of the 
income distribution and that they are over-represented among those with 10-15 years of 
education (see also Orrenius and Zovodny, 2006; Caponi, 2007). This could be accounted 
for by the low-educated facing higher migration costs, which in terms of Figure 1, could 
make the reservation wage function w(x) convex. Other studies have stressed the effects 
of migration networks in reducing costs and increasing the returns to migration. Thus 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find that networks identified in the source country 
increase the proportion of low educated migrants, while Munshi (2003) identifies the 
positive effects of networks at the destination on the employment probabilities and the 
occupational status of Mexican immigrants. Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2010) finds that 
a combination of network effects and wealth constraints explains the selection of 
migrants from rural Mexico. 
 These studies have provided much insight into migrant self-selection at the micro-
level. They stress the fact that migration costs are important and that policy barriers could 
be important in raising the costs e.g. of illegal migration. But they offer limited insight 
into the observed differences in the selectivity of migration across countries of 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, Aydemir (2003) finds that, for migration from the US to Canada, the high-educated are less 
likely to apply but are more likely to be accepted through Canada’s points system. Overall they are 
positively selected because the effect of skill-selective immigration policy outweighs the incentive effect 
that would otherwise favour low skilled migration.  
 
 6 
immigration.2 Less still do they explain why the skill-or education-content of emigration 
differs so much among countries of origin. Here we focus on the factors that drive the 
educational selectivity of migration across both sources and destinations—something that 
has been neglected until recently. One particular issue is the role of wealth or income 
constraints that lead to positive selection from poor countries despite the higher returns to 
education at home. This could be an important factor in the brain drain, and it is a key 
focus in the analysis we present below.  
Several recent papers have explored new datasets on the stock of immigrants 
observed in OECD countries by source country and by educational attainment (Dumont 
and Lemaître, 2004; Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Docquier et al. (2006) estimate 
models of the relative emigration rate of high- to low-educated migrants from source 
countries to the OECD as a whole. Focusing on source country characteristics they find 
that positive educational selection is associated negatively with the proportion with post-
secondary education and negatively with per capita GDP. These results would be 
consistent with poverty constraining the low-educated from emigration. Using bilateral 
data on the change in the migrant stock from the same data source, Beine et al. (2009) 
find that the larger is the initial emigrant stock the less positively selected is the 
subsequent flow. Both studies also find that the distance to OECD destinations has a 
positive effect on educational selection, together with other variables.  These results 
suggest that migration costs are more of a constraint for low skilled migration. However 
                                                 
2 Several studies use survey data on emigration intentions. Leibig and Sousa-Posa (2004) find that for a set 
of developed countries the stated intention to emigrate is increasing in the individual’s education but the 
effect is smaller the higher is the return to education at home. For five North African countries Van Dalen 
et al (2005) find that the most important single determinant of emigration intentions is the individual’s 
expectation of income gain.  
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the effects of the absolute poverty level are not measured directly, and as the relative 
return to education is not included, there is no assessment of the Roy model. 
Brücker and Defoort (2009) investigate the determinants of skill selectivity using 
data by source country and by 6 OECD destination countries at five year intervals over 
the period 1975-2000. They use source and destination gini coefficients as proxies for the 
returns to skills and they include a series of measures of geographical and cultural 
distances between countries. They find that both destination and source country 
inequality have positive effects; the latter being a priori inconsistent with the Roy model. 
This result is found in the presence of GDP per capita in source and destination as well as 
other bilateral controls. They rationalise this result by introducing an extended version of 
the Roy model which allows for a negative correlation between skill levels and moving 
costs. Thus the skilled find it more attractive to emigrate despite the higher return to skills 
in the home country. However, the relationship between migration costs and skill-
selectivity is not tested directly.  
Grogger and Hanson (2008) examine the stock of immigrants by level of 
education by source country and OECD destination country for 2000/1. They estimate 
separate equations for the educational selectivity of migration and for the sorting of 
migrants between sources and destinations. They focus on absolute wage gaps (or skill 
prices) between destination and source countries for each skill level as the incentive to 
emigrate. Thus the absolute gap could be higher for skilled emigrants, even if the relative 
gap (or wage premium differential) is not (see also Rozenzweig, 2010). They find that 
educational selection can be explained by absolute wage gaps without reference to 
poverty constraints, and that the absolute gap outperforms the relative gap. In addition 
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educational selectivity is positively associated with sharing a common language and with 
distance, and negatively with contiguity and with colonial links. Immigration policy is 
proxied by the share of asylum seekers, which has a negative effect on both the 
educational selection of migrants and sorting across destinations.  
 In what follows we use the database described by Doquier and Marfouk (2006) 
and Docquier et al. (2009), which counts migrants to the OECD by destination, by source 
and by education level, and which has been used in a number of the papers cited above.3 
We use the framework of the Roy model and to focus on educational selectivity from the 
source country perspective and on the effects of immigration policies in OECD 
destinations.   
Educational Selectivity by Source and Destination 
 The data covers the stock of foreign-born in all OECD countries in 2000/01 from 
all source countries by three levels of education, and is discussed in more detail in the 
data appendix. Table 1 looks at these migrants from the destination country perspective. 
The first column shows each destination country’s share of the foreign born aged 25 and 
over in the OECD. The United States is by far the largest host country with 41.6 percent 
of the total, while other traditional immigration countries, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand account for a further 15.8 percent. The EU-15 accounts for 34.3 percent of the 
OECD total with Germany the largest individual host country, followed by France and 
the UK. Other countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere contribute modestly to the total. 
The second column shows, for each country, the percentage of the population aged 25 
and over that is foreign-born. As is well-known, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
                                                 
3 In an earlier version of this paper we used a similar database produced by the OECD (Dumont and 
Lemaître, 2004). This produced results that are broadly similar to those reported below, see Belot and 
Hatton (2008).  
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have immigrant shares of over 20 percent--rates that are matched only by Switzerland 
and Luxembourg. Less well known is the fact that seven other members of the EU-15 
have immigrant shares that are over 10 percent and are comparable with that of the 
United States at 14.3 percent. 
The third column of Table 1 reports the percentage of foreign-born adults in each 
host country that is tertiary educated. Among the countries with skill-selective points 
systems, Canada, and Australia have ratios of over 40 percent, which are especially high 
when compared with European countries many of which have ratios of less than 20 
percent. Notable exceptions in Europe are the UK, Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg, with 
ratios of over 30 percent. Outside of Europe there are high ratios for some other high-
income countries such as Japan and the USA.  
Clearly, the education content of a destination country’s immigration depends in 
part on the shares of different source countries in total migration. Column (4) shows the 
result of applying source country immigration weights to source country high-education 
shares (emigrants plus residents). This gives an indication of the extent to which each 
destination draws migrants from relatively high-education sources. As is well known, the 
proportions of high-educated are much lower in the source country populations than they 
are for migrants, and so the figures in column (4) are typically below those in column (3). 
However the difference between these figures varies widely and the correlation 
coefficient between columns (3) and (4) is only 0.23. This suggests that much of the 
variation in the skill content of immigration is due to the way that immigrants from a 
given source are selected rather than simply the underlying source country composition.  
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Table 2 examines migrants to the OECD from the perspective of the source 
region. The first column shows the percentage of OECD immigrant stock that is 
accounted for by different source regions. Nearly half of these (48 percent) are intra-
OECD migrants, while in terms of continents, 27.1 percent come from the Americas, 37.6 
percent come from Europe (including the former Soviet Union) and 12.7 percent come 
from Asia (including the Middle East). The second column shows the shares of high-
educated migrants to the OECD from different source regions. Here the pattern is slightly 
different, with Asia accounting for a greater share of high-educated migrants than of all 
migrants.  
The third column shows for each sending region the percentage of its emigrants 
that are high educated. As might be expected, the ratios are relatively high (35 percent or 
above) for North America, Australia/New Zealand and Northwestern Europe. But the 
education content is also high for emigrants from most of Asia, from the former Soviet 
Union and even from Sub-Saharan Africa. To some degree this is reflected by the 
(migrant weighted) percentages of high educated (migrants plus residents) in each 
region’s source countries (column 4). Although the correlation coefficient between the 
country level data underlying columns (2) and (3) is 0.5, there are substantial deviations. 
For countries in Asia and Africa the high-educated share among emigrants is far higher 
than that of the overall source country populations. In some other cases such as Central 
America, Southern Europe and North America the gap between emigrants and source 
country populations much smaller. These comparisons immediately raise the question of 
how such large differences in educational selection across countries and regions can be 
accounted for.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Selection by skill has been a central focus of much of the literature that employs 
some variant of the Roy model. Here we use a modified version of this framework. We 
characterise the probability that an individual migrates as depending on three 
components. The first is the probability that the individual finds it in his or her interest to 
migrate on cost-benefit grounds. The second is immigration policy through which 
migrants are screened. And third there is selection at the origin, arising from the fact that 
some individuals may be too poor to afford the costs of migration. 
The incentive for individual i to migrate, Ii, is the difference between the utility 
from the economic gains and the non-economic loss or compensating differential. 
Assuming logarithmic utility we can express the incentive to migrate as  
ixiyii zcwwI  )ln(ln , or i
xi
xiyii z
w
c
wwI  )1ln(lnln   (1) 
where wy and wx are earnings in the destination and origin respectively and c is the direct 
cost of migration, all assumed to be in present value terms. z is the compensating 
differential representing the individual’s non-economic preferences. In order to capture 
heterogeneity in individual preferences we assume that zi is a random variable with mean 
0z  reflecting a positive average preference for the origin country. 
Earnings in origin and destination depend on education and a random unobserved 
productivity component, while earnings at the destination also depend on a term 
representing the ‘cultural’ distance between the origin and the destination: 
xiixi sw   10ln , and yiiiyi susw   )(ln 3210    (2) 
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where si is individual i’s education level, which we assume is bounded by 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 (later 
we will assign the value 1 to the high educated and 0 to the low educated). We assume 
that the unobserved components of the wage εx and εy have mean zero and are 
uncorrelated with the individual’s preference for migration. The term u is a measure of 
‘cultural distance’ between the source and the destination that affects the transferability 
of educational skills. The greater the cultural distance the less transferable are these skills 
and therefore the lower is the wage in the destination. High education may help bridge 
the culture gap so that if β3 > 0 the wage penalty is lower for the more highly educated. 
On the other hand cultural difference may have smaller effects on productivity in low 
education jobs where there is little human capital to be transferred, in which case β3 < 0. 
We characterise the direct cost of migration simply as )1( isd  , where d is a 
measure of the direct costs, which decline with education level. Hence the individual’s 
incentive to migrate is: 
iixiyiiii zsddususI  1321100 )(     (3) 
Immigration policy acts as a screen and it may be skill selective. We interpret 
immigration policy as raising the costs of migration such that the policy cost for 
individual i is: 
ii sP 10             (4) 
If policy is not skill-selective then δ1 = 0.  An across-the-board toughening in policy 
raises the policy cost of immigration by increasing δ0, while an increase in skill-
selectivity holding overall toughness constant can be achieved increasing both δ0 and δ1. 
 An important feature of our model is the poverty constraint; people living close to 
subsistence find it much more difficult to migrate. While it might seem possible to 
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borrow, it will be difficult to provide collateral based on future earnings when the 
purpose of the loan is to leave the country.  Thus, the greater are the migration costs, the 
higher is the general incidence of poverty in the origin country, and the more likely a 
given individual is to be poor, the less likely that he/she will be able to migrate. We 
express the poverty constraint effect as the product of these three factors: 
)1( iii srCR            (5) 
where r is the general poverty rate and Ci represents the total cost of migration including 
both the direct cost and the policy cost. These costs could be prohibitive for a low 
educated individual in a poor country facing sufficiently high migration costs. 
Substituting direct and policy costs as defined above, the poverty cost can be expressed 
as: 
)1())(( 110 iii srsddR           (6) 
Provided that the sum of migration costs is positive, the poverty cost Ri is increasing in 
the poverty rate and decreasing in s up to s = 1. Putting together the incentive to migrate, 
the policy cost and the poverty cost, the probability that individual i will migrate is: 
))1())((
)(Pr()1Pr(
10
13112000
yixiiii
ii
zsrsdd
sduudm




  (7) 
We characterise the total migration rate as depending on these variables such that:  
zsrsdd
sduud
N
M
T
T


)1())((
)(
10
13112000


   (8) 
where s is the mean of si . We assume two education levels, high educated, si = 1, and 
low educated, si = 0, and thus s is the share of high-educated in the population. The 
migration rate for high-educated individuals is:  
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zduud
N
M
H
H  13112000      (9) 
And the migration rate for low-educated individuals is:  
zrdud
N
M
L
L  )( 02000       (10) 
Thus the difference between the migration rates of the high- and the low-educated is:  
rddu
N
M
N
M
L
L
H
H )( 011311        (11) 
As in the Roy model, an increase in the return to skills in the destination relative 
to the origin increases positive selection. In this specific case, an increase in β1 – α1 
increases migration among the high educated but not among the low educated.  Cultural 
distance affects selection through β3, which could be positive or negative.  Positive 
selection is also related to direct migration costs through dγ1 and through the policy 
selectivity term δ1. Finally, the degree of poverty, r, reduces unskilled migration and 
therefore increases positive selection, both directly and through the interaction with 
migration costs.  
Estimating framework and data 
We use the theoretical approach above to motivate an empirical model of migrant 
selectivity from country x to country y by specifying the following estimating equation: 
yxyxyx
xyxyx
Lx
Hx
Ly
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Hx
Lyx
Hyx
PolaPovDista
PovaDistaCulta
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65
43210
)(
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 (12) 
The dependent variable is the log of ratio of high- to low-educated migrants from x to y 
divided by high- to low-educated in the population of origin country x. This measures the 
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educational selectivity of migration from x to y. The first of the explanatory variables is 
the difference in the wage premium for high over low educated workers between the 
destination and source countries. The basic test of the Roy model is that a1 > 0.  Because 
of the restriction imposed on the two wage ratios this variable varies by origin and by 
destination. The second term is cultural similarity which is specific to each country pair 
and which could be positive or negative in sign. The distance between x and y, which 
varies across bilateral pairs, is a proxy for direct migration costs. Since these are less of a 
deterrent to the high educated we expect that a3 > 0.  
The fourth and fifth terms capture the poverty constraint that affects the low 
educated in poor countries. The effect of poverty is to increase high-education 
selectivity—the more so the higher are the costs of migration.   Hence we expect a4 > 0 
and a5 > 0. The interacted term varies by source and destination but the poverty rate 
varies only by the origin country. Selective immigration policy, Poly, is destination 
specific and it may be skill selective. We first capture this with a dummy for each 
destination country, which will also absorb any other destination-specific effects.  But 
further below we investigate some direct measures of skill selective immigration policy.4  
  The data that we use for the numerator of our dependent variable is the ratio of 
tertiary educated to those with secondary or lower education among migrants aged 25 and 
over from a source country to an OECD destination country.  As noted earlier, this stock 
data for the year 2000/1 is from the database developed by Docquier and colleagues. The 
denominator is the ratio of tertiary to secondary or lower educated among of the source 
                                                 
4 The theory set out in the previous section considers only one destination but in our empirical model we 
estimate migration from a given source country to a number of different destinations. Third country effects 
could potentially matter but, if cross-destination effects are symmetric, the alternatives to any given 
destination are constant across sources and can be absorbed by the destination dummy.  
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country population aged 25 and over, where the emigrants have been added back to the 
source country population in order to obtain the population at risk.5 Studies of the 
migrant flows often find that the initial stock is the most important single determinant, 
and thus current migration depends on migration in the recent past.6 By analysing the 
stock we focus on long run determinants, and so the explanatory variables are constructed 
from data stretching back for two decades.  
Migration studies sometimes use the gini coefficient of household income as a 
proxy for the return to skills.7 However this variable is far from ideal as it measures 
income from all sources and it reflects the proportions at each income level. In order to 
better capture the relative price of skills we use the ratio of the wage in a set of 
occupations that normally require some tertiary education to the wage in a set of 
unskilled occupations. These are calculated from Freeman and Oostendorp and cover the 
years 1983 to 2000. Gross wages may be misleading as a measure of the overall 
migration incentive and there is evidence that migration is influenced by differences in 
income tax rates (Egger and Radulescu, 2009). In order to adjust gross wage rates to net 
we use a new database on international income tax rates kindly provided by Sabrianova 
Peter et al. (2009). We adjust the skilled wage by the average tax rate at the third quartile 
of income and the unskilled wage rate by the average tax rate at the first quartile.  
The percentage in poverty is based on the World Bank’s estimate of the 
proportion of population living with incomes of less than $2 per day. Because this is only 
                                                 
5 No adjustment is made for the brain gain effects of emigration on the non-emigrant population; if there 
was some educational response then the effects we estimate would be downward biased.  
6 Studies of annual gross migration flows that stress migrant stock effects in include Clark et al. (2007) and 
Pederson et al. (2008). Using the data source examined here, Beine et al. (2009) find that the migrant stock 
is also an important determinant of the skill composition subsequent migration.  
7 These include Borjas (1987) Leibig and Sousa-Poza (2004), Clark et al. (2007) and Brücker and Defoort 
(2009). 
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available for recent years we develop a long run average poverty rate using the share of 
agriculture in GDP as a predictor. Across the source countries in our data for which the 
World Bank poverty share is non-zero the correlation between poverty and the 
agricultural share in 2000 is 0.85. We therefore apply the prediction from a regression of 
the $2 per day poverty rate on the agricultural share to the average agricultural share over 
the years 1980 to 2000. 
The costs of migration are reflected in the distance between the capitals of the 
source and destination countries. This is entered in logarithmic form so that marginal 
migration costs decline with distance. Cultural distance between source and destination 
pairs is represented by linguistic proximity, which is based on the number of common 
nodes on the linguistic tree that are shared between one language and another. Further 
details of the definition and sources of the variables can be found in the data appendix.  
Results for Educational Selection  
Our estimates of different variants of the model appear in Table 3. Column (1) 
shows the results for a specification that includes the wage premium differential, adjusted 
for source and destination taxes, and the variables that reflect geographical and cultural 
distance between the source and destination countries, but excludes source country 
poverty rates. This produces an insignificant negative coefficient on the wage premium 
differential, which is the opposite of what the Roy model would predict. One reason is 
that, across source countries, the net wage premium is positively associated with poverty; 
the correlation coefficient is 0.56. Thus the source country wage ratio could be capturing 
a mixture of the ‘true’ negative effect on selection operating through the wage premium 
differential and the positive selection effect operating through the poverty constraint.  
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Column (2) of the table adds the poverty rate and the interaction between distance 
and poverty, both of which should have positive effects according to our model. The 
results support the hypothesis that source country poverty is associated with positive 
selection. We find that the estimates of a4 and a5 are both positive and significant. 
Introducing these poverty variables has a dramatic effect on the coefficient of the wage 
premium differential, which now becomes positive and significant. That is, controlling 
for poverty, source countries with a higher wage premium are associated with more 
negative selection. However, the estimated effect of skill selection with respect to the 
wage premium is relatively modest; a ten percentage point increase in the wage premium 
differential would increase the share of high-skilled emigrants in the total by about half a 
percentage point.   
Consistent with other studies, we find that distance, as a proxy for migration 
costs, has a positive effect on educational selection, an effect that remains strong in the 
presence of the interaction with poverty. The negative effect of colonial history may 
reflect the long-term effects of the initially low barriers to immigration from post-
independence colonies that generated persistent streams of low-skilled migrants. This 
effect is large, reducing the share of skilled migrants in a given migration stream 
(evaluated at the mean skill share) by 23 percentage points. We have no clear prediction 
for the effects of linguistic proximity. On the one hand high education may make it easier 
to bridge the linguistic gap, in which case closer linguistic proximity should lead to 
negative skill selection. On the other hand for the lower educated with fewer skills to 
transfer, linguistic distance may be less of a barrier, in which case proximity may lead to 
positive selection. The positive coefficient on linguistic proximity in column (2) of Table 
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3 suggests that the transferability of human capital may be easier when language is less of 
a barrier. In our initial estimates we also included a common language dummy. But this 
was insignificant in the presence of linguistic proximity, as the two variables are highly 
correlated (correlation coefficient 0.75), and so it was dropped.  
 As noted earlier Grogger and Hanson (2008) specify their model as linear utility 
rather than logarithmic utility. Thus they use the absolute wage gap, rather than the 
relative gap in the selection equation and they omit any direct measure of poverty. In 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 we investigate this alternative functional form by 
expressing the wage gap as )()( LxLyHxHy wwww  , where tax adjusted wage rates 
are measured in thousands of purchasing-power-parity adjusted US dollars. In column 
(3), where poverty and its interaction with distance are excluded, we find that the 
absolute wage gap produces a highly significant positive coefficient, which is consistent 
with the findings of Grogger and Hanson. Because the absolute wage gap tends to be 
larger for the skilled than for the unskilled from poor countries it captures much of the 
positive selection. If this were the ‘correct’ specification then the poverty variables 
should not be significant. However in column (4) both the poverty coefficients are 
positive and the interaction with distance is significant. Furthermore the coefficient on 
the absolute wage gap becomes negative, even though it has only a modest correlation 
with poverty (-0.16). 
Alternative specifications  
The results so far suggest a strong role for poverty in explaining the patterns of 
skill selection, and in Table 5 we explore a number of alternative specifications to check 
the robustness of the key results. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is 
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disaggregated by sex. Overall the results are rather similar to those for all migrants. For 
women the coefficients on the wage premium differential and linguistic proximity are 
smaller than for men. This may be because women more often move for family 
reunification. Poverty matters more for women while the interaction with distance 
matters more for men.  
One concern is that some migrants received their education in the destination 
country and therefore that the education mix is determined partly by post-migration 
conditions. This is mitigated to some degree by the fact that the skill composition of 
immigrants is restricted to those aged 25 and over. But as an alternative we used a 
version of the data that has been adjusted for those who could have received all or part of 
their education at the destination, based on estimates of the age of arrival. As column (3) 
shows the result is very similar to that for the unadjusted data in column (2) of Table 3. In 
column (4) the dependent variable is the ratio of tertiary educated migrants to those with 
only primary education (leaving out those with secondary education). This would be 
more consistent with the high/low wage premium differential, but again result is similar 
to that in column (2) of Table 3.  
In columns (5) and (6) we use different versions of the wage differential. As noted 
above it has been suggested that tax rates play an important role in the incentive to 
migrate. Unlike other studies we use a comprehensive tax database that allows us to 
calculate net wages for both rich and poor countries. However column (5) shows that it 
makes only a marginal difference if gross wage differentials are used. Perhaps more 
important is the measure used for the (gross) wage premium differential. In column (6) 
we use the absolute difference between destination and source country gini coefficients as 
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a proxy for the wage premium differential. This gives a strong positive coefficient as the 
Roy model would predict and while some of the other coefficients are weaker, the share 
in poverty remains positive and strongly significant.  
We have also experimented with alternative measures of poverty. In column (7) 
we use the share in extreme poverty--$1 per day rather than $2 per day. As might be 
expected the coefficient on poverty increases in size but otherwise the results are similar 
to column (2) in Table 3. Thus the results appear to be reasonably robust to the definition 
of poverty. However, one possible concern is that the source country skill mix in the 
denominator may be linked to poverty through a bi-directional relationship.8 If so then 
introducing the level of GDP per capita (which is strongly correlated with source country 
skills) would be expected to have the same effects as poverty—but with a different 
interpretation. To test this hypothesis we introduce per capita GDP (from the Penn World 
Tables) in place of poverty, including the interaction with distance. As column (8) shows, 
when GDP is substituted for poverty the main effect is positive but the interaction is now 
significantly negative. As our model predicts a positive interaction effect, it seems that 
poverty is not just standing in for other effects that can be captured by GDP per capita. 
The Effects of Policy in Destination Countries 
As noted above, selective immigration policies can be viewed as a screening 
mechanism that imposes differential costs on potential immigrants by skill and education. 
Here the focus is on policies that influence the composition of immigrants rather than the 
total number. These policies include not only selection at the border but also behind-
border policies that affect self-selection. It is widely believed that immigration policies 
                                                 
8 A negative relationship between the denominator of the dependent variable in equation (12), NHx/NLx, and 
poverty could induce a positive bias to the coefficient α4 and/or α5 as a result of a causal link from low 
skills to poverty. Across the observations in our dataset the correlation between these two variables is -0.69.   
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that place greater weight on family reunification and refugees are likely to select lower 
skilled immigrants. Within the employment stream, the degree to which foreign 
qualifications and skills are recognised in the host country must also be considered as part 
of selective policy. More indirectly, the generosity of the welfare state is often seen as 
attracting less skilled migrants (Boeri et al, 2002; Di Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Boeri, 
2010).  
Unfortunately we have no comprehensive indicator of the degree of selective 
policy across destination countries, and hence we rely on a set of proxies. To capture the 
generosity of the welfare state we use the share of social spending in GDP. In addition we 
use three indicators of skill-selective policy. The first is based on data from the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, which reports the responses of business executives to a 
question on how far immigration policies permit the hiring of foreign employees. We 
interpret greater flexibility as representing more employment-friendly policy. The second 
relates to the restrictiveness of the country’s policy towards professional workers 
(Nguyen Hong, 2000). We use the components relating to immigrants to construct a 
measure of the ease with which professionals can transfer their skills. The third indicator 
is a dummy for countries that select skills through a points system (Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand). By contrast, the non-selective effect of a common labour market is 
captured by share of the time between 1980 and 2000 that two countries allowed free 
labour mobility.  
  The regressions presented in Table 5 include policy indices in place of the 
destination country dummies, but are otherwise equivalent to column (2) of Table 3. Note 
that the coefficients on the non-policy variables are little changed by the exclusion of the 
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destination dummies. In the first column, the size of the welfare state has a negative 
selection effect, as predicted, but the coefficient is not significant. However it increases in 
size and significance when the variables for employment flexibility and low restrictions 
on professionals are added in column (2). The ease with which professionals can transfer 
their skills appears to be the most important effect and it probably reflects more widely 
the transferability of specific skills. This effect is potentially important: a one standard 
deviation increase in the index is associated with a four percentage point increase in the 
share of high-skilled in total migration. In comparison, the welfare magnet effect of a five 
percentage point increase in the social expenditure share increases the share of high 
skilled in total migration by about 2.5 percentage points.  
In column (3) we add the free mobility dummy which gives a positive coefficient, 
contrary to expectation. This variable relates to the EU and it suggests some positive 
selection of inter-EU migrants. Column (4) adds the dummy for three countries with 
points systems, which gives a positive coefficient as expected. This implies that shifting 
to a points system raises the share of high-skilled in total migration by about six 
percentage points. These results suggest that the skill content of migration has been 
shaped, at least in part by policy. However we do not have measures that capture policy 
on family reunion and refugees, which are not dependent on the ex-post composition of 
arrivals. It seems likely that, if such policies could be adequately measured, they would 
have larger effects than policies relating only to skill selectiveness within the 
employment stream.  
Conclusion 
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In this paper we have examined, and attempted to explain, the selection by 
education of immigrants from a wide variety of source countries into the countries of the 
OECD. Since the labour market quality of immigrants is of increasing concern to 
developed-country governments, it is important to know what are the key forces 
determining the educational selectivity of immigration. Although considerable research 
has been devoted to differences in selection and outcomes for immigrants to a given 
destination (usually the US) there have been relatively few attempts to analyse this 
selection across source and destination countries. As a result it has not been possible to 
fully explore the predictions of standard migration theory. 
Broadly speaking our results contain four main findings. The first relates to the 
Roy model, which predicts that the greater the return to skills in the destination as 
compared to the source country, the stronger will be the positive selection of immigrants 
by skill-level.  This effect is not observed in the simplest model but it reappears once we 
allow for the fact that many potential immigrants in poor counties are constrained from 
migrating by poverty. This explains the paradox that migrants from poor countries, where 
the returns to education and skills are large, are strongly positively selected from among 
the source country populations.  
Following from this, the second finding is that the costs and constraints are 
important in shaping the selectivity of migration. Distance, which reflects the costs of 
migration, and poverty, which reflects liquidity constraints, are both associated with more 
highly educated migration streams. A further implication suggested by theory is that the 
poverty constraint should bite harder where migration costs are higher. Our results 
strongly support the hypothesis that the interaction between poverty and distance 
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increases positive skill selectivity from a given source country. We also find that this 
effect is not adequately captured by recasting the wage incentive as the absolute wage 
gap rather than the relative wage gap.  
Third, like other studies we find that cultural similarities and colonial legacies are 
important in shaping the skill content of migration. The net effect of linguistic proximity 
is positive indicating that human capital is more easily transferred between cognate 
language groups but it may also reflect wider cultural similarities. More important still 
are colonial legacies which probably reflect the persistent effects of postcolonial policies 
that gave preferential access to unskilled migrants from former colonies. These large 
negative effects are particularly important for European countries and help to explain 
their lower immigrant skills.  
 Finally we have investigated the effects of skill selective immigration policies in 
destination countries. Although our measures of selective policy are imperfect they do 
attempt to capture elements of post-immigration policy that shape migration incentives. 
We find some evidence for negative welfare magnet selection effects, particularly when 
we control for other policies. We also find that points systems and policies that encourage 
the transfer of professional skills have non-trivial positive selection effects. However 
these measures are only partial and do not capture the potentially large effects of policies 
towards family reunification and refugees. Thus, more definitive conclusions about the 
overall effects of policy on skill selection must await the development of more 
comprehensive indicators of policy.   
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Table 1:  Immigration to the OECD 
Host Country Code 
(1) 
 
Percent of 
OECD 
Migrant Stock 
(2) 
 
 
Percent 
Foreign-born 
(3) 
 
Percent of  
Foreign-born 
Hi-Educated 
(4) 
Weighted 
Source 
Country Hi-
Educated 
Australia AUS 7.0 32.8 40.3 12.9 
Austria AUT 1.4 14.1 12.7 14.2 
Belgium BEL 1.6 12.6 19.8 13.7 
Canada CAN 7.9 22.4 58.8 13.7 
Switzerland CHE 2.6 29.7 11.5 11.8 
Czech Republic CZE 0.7 5.8 17.3 12.5 
Germany DEU 8.0 7.8 23.8 12.2 
Denmark DNK 0.4 6.1 16.4 14.5 
Spain ESP 2.7 5.5 21.8 14.8 
Finland FIN 0.2 2.5 15.0 17.7 
France FRA 6.3 9.2 11.6 9.4 
United Kingdom GBR 6.0 8.7 31.4 12.5 
Greece GRC 0.7 5.6 41.1 14.9 
Hungary HUN 0.2 1.5 15.4 7.6 
Iceland  0.0 12.2 28.1 19.0 
Ireland IRL 0.5 12.1 38.1 18.3 
Italy ITA 1.6 2.2 21.7 12.3 
Japan JPN 1.6 1.0 44.9 17.7 
South Korea KOR 0.2 0.4 22.0 12.5 
Luxembourg LUX 0.2 33.2 40.9 16.1 
Mexico MEX 0.3 0.4 28.7 28.5 
Netherlands NLD 3.1 16.1 14.0 13.2 
Norway NOR 0.4 7.3 18.6 17.2 
New Zealand NZL 0.9 21.9 15.2 15.7 
Poland POL 1.3 3.0 18.5 18.5 
Portugal PRT 0.3 2.1 25.7 9.8 
Slovak Republic SVK 0.1 1.1 18.6 5.4 
Sweden SWE 1.3 12.3 21.5 16.8 
Turkey TUR 1.2 2.1 34.9 18.3 
United States USA 41.6 13.3 42.7 13.2 
Notes: Data underlying Docquier, et al. (2009) accessed at 
http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm. The figures relate to population aged 25 and above.  
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Table 2: Migrants to the OECD by Region of Origin 
World Region 
(1) 
Percent 
of Total 
Migrants 
to OECD 
(2) 
Percent 
of Hi-Ed 
Migrants 
to OECD 
 
(3)  
Percent 
of 
Migrants 
High-
Educated 
(4) 
Percent 
of Source 
Popn 
High- 
Educated 
North America 2.7 4.7 61.9 51.3 
Central America 14.2 7.0 17.6 11.2 
Caribbean 5.2 5.6 38.2 9.3 
South America 5.0 5.7 39.8 12.3 
Scandinavia 1.3 1.3 37.1 24.7 
UK and Ireland 6.4 8.4 46.5 17.9 
Western Europe 8.2 9.2 39.6 23.4 
Southern Europe 8.9 4.3 17.4 10.4 
Eastern Europe 9.8 7.7 28.0 12.2 
Fmr Soviet Union 3.0 3.3 39.9 18.8 
East Asia 7.2 11.0 54.6 5.7 
South Asia 7.5 10.5 49.3 8.3 
Middle East 5.2 7.6 51.6 4.3 
North Africa 6.3 4.8 27.5 9.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.9 7.0 31.5 3.9 
Pacific Islands 0.4 0.4 36.1 5.6 
Australia and NZ 1.0 1.4 51.9 32.6 
 
Notes: Data underlying  Docquier et al. (2009) accessed at: 
http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm. The figures relate to population aged 25 and above.  
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Table 3: Determinants of skill selection  
Dependent variable: Log high/(medium+low) education ratio, migrants to non-migrants. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Relative wage gap Absolute wage gap  
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
-0.087 
(0.071) 
0.236** 
(0.057) 
  
Absolute wage differential  
(destination – source) 
  0.561** 
(0.089) 
-0.270** 
(0.077) 
Linguistic proximity 0.140** 
(0.015) 
0.135** 
(0.012) 
0.165** 
(0.147) 
0.114* 
(0.012) 
Colonial relationship post-1945 -0.126 
(0.142) 
-0.962** 
(0.116) 
0.341* 
(0.143) 
-0.821** 
(0.115) 
Log distance (most populated 
cities, 1,000 km) 
0.680** 
(0.040) 
0.340** 
(0.035) 
0.720** 
(0.039) 
0.277** 
(0.036) 
Share in poverty   0.008* 
(0.004) 
 0.005 
(0.003) 
Log distance × share in poverty  0.009** 
(0.002) 
 0.011** 
(0.002) 
Constant 0.046 
(0.083) 
0.025 
(0.077) 
-0.434 
(0.111) 
0.315 
(0.097) 
Observations 1137 1067 1137 1067 
R-squared 0.430 0.685 0.449 0.682 
Country of destination dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination country.  
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Table 4: Determinants of skill selection – Alternative Specifications 
Dependent variable: Log high/(medium+low) education ratio, migrants to non-migrants. 
 
 (1) 
Men 
(2) 
Women  
 
(3) 
Education 
in source 
country 
(4) 
High vs 
low 
education 
(5) 
Gross 
wage 
(6) 
Gini 
coefficient 
for wage 
diff 
(7) 
Poverty 
line of $1 
per day 
(8) 
GDP 
instead of 
poverty 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
0.357** 
(0.063) 
0.199* 
(0.061) 
0.348** 
(0.064) 
0.224** 
(0.072) 
0.241** 
(0.058) 
0.051** 
(0.003) 
0.262** 
(0.054) 
0.175** 
(0.063) 
Linguistic proximity 0.165** 
(0.013) 
0.114** 
(0.013) 
0.161** 
(0.013) 
0.158** 
(0.015) 
0.133** 
(0.012) 
0.070** 
(0.011) 
0.145** 
(0.011) 
0.147** 
(0.013) 
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.933** 
(0.124) 
-1.104** 
(0.122) 
-1.041** 
(0.126) 
-1.000** 
(0.142) 
-0.948** 
(0.114) 
-0.581** 
(0.106) 
-0.855** 
(0.110) 
-1.033** 
(0.126) 
Log distance (most populated 
cities, 1,000 km) 
0.385** 
(0.038) 
0.317** 
(0.037) 
0.408** 
(0.038) 
0.539** 
(0.043) 
0.328** 
(0.034) 
0.338** 
(0.031) 
0.386** 
(0.033) 
1.539 
(0.066) 
Share in poverty  -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.024** 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.021** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.023** 
(0.004) 
0.042** 
(0.004) 
0.038** 
(0.008) 
Log distance × share in poverty 0.013** 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.010** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.069** 
(0.004) 
Constant -0.106 
(0.083) 
0.101 
(0.082) 
-0.651 
(0.084) 
-0.372 
(0.305) 
0.073 
(0.075) 
0.449 
(0.069) 
-0.127 
(0.063) 
-0.787 
(0.118) 
Observations 1033 1024 1067 1048 1112 953 1067 1137 
R-squared 0.670 0.696 0.674 0.673 0.678 0.760 0.697 0.608 
         
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants 
from the source country to the destination country. 
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Table 5: The effects of selective immigration policy on skill selection  
Dependent variable: Log high/(medium+low) education ratio, migrants to non-migrants. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log wage premium differential  
(destination – source) 
0.233** 
(0.058) 
0.276** 
(0.058) 
0.266** 
(0.0658 
0.271** 
(0.058) 
Linguistic proximity 0.147** 
(0.012) 
0.143** 
(0.011) 
0.141** 
(0.027) 
0.122** 
(0.012) 
Colonial relationship post 1945 -0.929** 
(0.109) 
-1.037** 
(0.110) 
-1.024** 
(0.110) 
-0.864** 
(0.115) 
Log distance (most populated 
cities, 1,000 km) 
0.357** 
(0.028) 
0.363** 
(0.029) 
0.403** 
(0.034) 
0.330** 
(0.038) 
Share in poverty  0.007 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Log distance × share in poverty 0.010** 
(0.0003) 
0.010** 
(3.86) 
0.009** 
(0.002) 
0.010** 
(0.002) 
Social expenditure share in 
GDP 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.024** 
(0.008) 
-0.028** 
(0.008) 
-0.032** 
(0.008) 
Flexibility  0.132 
(0.068) 
0.126 
(0.067) 
0.0057 
(0.069) 
Low restrictions on 
professionals 
 0.289** 
(0.052) 
0.266** 
(0.053) 
0.302** 
(0.053) 
EU pair   0.245* 
(0.114) 
0.254* 
(0.113) 
Points system    0.341** 
(0.08) 
Constant 0.091 
(0.140) 
0.296 
(0.058) 
0.289 
(0.150) 
0.402 
(0.151) 
Observations 1067 1050 1050 1050 
R-squared 0.648 0.651 0.658 0.664 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is 
weighted by the corresponding total number of migrants from the source country to the destination country.  
 
  
 
 36 
Data Appendix 
 
Migrant skills. The data that we use for immigrants is that constructed by Docquier et al. (2009) and 
available at: (http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm). They count the number of foreign-
born working-age individuals (age 25 or above) living in an OECD country (in 1990 and 2000), by skill 
and by gender. The three educational categories: low corresponds to 0 to 8 years of schooling completed,  
medium to those with secondary education (9 to 12 years of schooling) and high corresponds to those with 
tertiary education. To obtain immigration rates, we divide these variables by the total number of people 
born in the source country and belonging to the same education category, also constructed by Docquier et 
al. (2009). Importantly, the stock of emigrants is added to the denominator.  
As part of a robustness check, we apply a correction factor for age of entry proposed by Beine, et 
al. (2006). Data on age of entry are available from a subset of receiving countries which together represent 
more than 3/4 of total skilled immigration to the OECD. They used this data and a gravity model (that also 
includes variables such as per capita GDP, colonial links and linguistic proximity) to estimate the age-of-
entry structure of skilled immigration. The correction factor is calculated as the ratio between the variables 
“Brain drain 22+” and “Brain drain 0”, where “Brain drain 0+” is stock of skilled OECD foreign-born 
adults by country of origin as percent of skilled natives (including emigrants) and “Brain drain 22+” 
corresponds to the adults who arrived at age 22 or above. Note that this variable is available for each source 
country, but does not distinguish between destination countries.  
 
Skill premium. We use data from the Occupation Wages around the World database, constructed by 
Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/oww/. The data include standardized 
wage information for 161 occupations in over 150 countries from 1983 to 2003 and is based on the ILO 
October Inquiry that asks governments to report annually on wages for a wide range of occupations. The 
ILO dataset is not directly usable because of the lack of comparability in reported wage formats across 
countries and over time. Freeman and Oostendorp corrected the data in such a way that wages could be 
made comparable across occupations, countries and over time.  
Given that occupations may differ in their skill requirements across countries, we choose to 
construct a skill premium measure based on occupations that are highly-skilled (and do require at least 
some tertiary education) and unskilled occupations, which according to the ILO description “require a 
minimum of training or no previous experience”.  We calculate the wages corresponding to each skill level 
as follows. First, we calculated the median value of the wages available for each year (for each skill level). 
Second, we computed the average of these median values over the period available. The constructed 
variable corresponds to the gross wage in dollars for each skill level. It must be noted that there are missing 
values for certain country/years and we have made special adjustments for Belgium and Japan where too 
few observations were available.  
To calculate the net wages in purchasing power parity, we multiply the gross wages by a factor (1-
tax rate) and divide it by the index of purchasing power parity. The tax rate is calculated using the data set 
constructed by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2009), who computed average and marginal tax rates corresponding 
to different income levels over the period 1981-2005 and for 189 countries. We apply the average tax rate 
corresponding to the 25th income percentile for the low-skilled wages and 75th income percentile for the 
high-skilled wage. The purchasing power parity adjustment is taken from the Penn World Tables for the 
period between 1981 and 2000.  
 
Language proximity. Values from 1 to 5 calculated from the number of common nodes in the linguistic tree 
between the closest official languages of pairs of countries (based on the language classification tree of the 
Ethnologue).  
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Colonial links. Dummy equal to 1 for pairs sharing a colonial link after 1945. Source : Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. 
 
Poverty. The proportion of the source country population living on less than $2 per day ($1 in robustness 
checks) comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers). This is the average of the (available) 
yearly values between 1980 and 2000. The imputed poverty measure corresponds to the predicted value of 
poverty from a linear regression of poverty on the average share of agriculture in GDP over 1980-2000.  
The share of Agriculture in GDP comes from the World Bank’s Development Indicators as well and is the 
average share for the years 1980-2000.  
 
Distance. Distance in kilometres between capital cities, taken from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales, at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
 
Gini coefficient: from Deininger and Squire (1996). Average gini coefficient calculated over the period 
1980-1996 (for all available years). The data is publicly available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699070~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html.  
 
Employment flexibility. Based on survey responses of business executives where 0 corresponds to the 
statement “immigration laws prevent the company from hiring foreign employees” and 10 corresponds to 
the statement “immigration laws do not prevent the company from hiring foreign employees.” This is taken 
from the International Institute of for Management Development, World Competitiveness Yearbook 
(Lausanne: IMD) for the years 1992, 1994, and 1997-2000 and adjusted to zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  
 
Low restrictions on professionals.  Data is taken from worksheets underlying the study by Nguyen Hong 
(2000) of restrictions on trade in professional services, covering professionals in engineering, architecture, 
accountancy and law.  The subset of indicators used here are those on policy rules in each sector related to  
nationality or citizenship requirements, permanent residence, quotas on foreign professionals, accreditation, 
licensing and business ownership. A weighted average of scores (in the range 0 to 1, higher numbers 
reflecting more permissive policy) is constructed for each profession, and these are then averaged over the 
four professions to give a single value for each country. 
 
Social expenditures (% GDP): Average share of social expenditures in the GDP over the period 1980-2000, 
OECD statistics, www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.  
 
Sample selection: The number of bilateral observations that we can use in our analysis limited by missing 
destination and/or  source country data for a number of the variables. For the migration data we have a total 
of ?? available bilateral observations across ?? destinations and ?? source countries. Our tax adjusted wage 
differential data covers ?? bilateral pairs across ?? destinations and ?? sources.  Among the source countries 
represented in the migration data we have a measure of poverty for ?? countries, and we have the gini 
coeffcienint for ?? sources and ?? destinations. Other variables do not impose a constraint on the total 
number of available observations [Lng Prox??]. The number of observations by destination and source 
country that underlie our preferred specification (Col. 2, Table 3) is detailed in the following table.  
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Appendix Table:  Destination and source countries used in estimation 
Destination  No of obs Destination  No of obs Destination  No of obs 
Australia 72 Ireland 35  Poland 17 
Austria 37  Italy 71 Portugal 63 
Belgium 73 Japan 22 Sweden 40 
Canada 72  Luxembourg 67 Turkey 18 
Denmark 72  Mexico 40 United Kingdom 73 
Finland 65  Netherlands 9 United States 73 
Germany  15  New Zealand 64   
Hungary 1  Norway 68 Total  1067 
      
Source        No of obs Source        No of obs Source        No of obs 
Algeria 17 Ethiopia 13 Nigeria 16 
Angola 13 Finland 17 Norway 17 
Argentina 17 Gabon 9 Papua New Guinea            8
Australia 18 Germany 21 Peru 16 
Austria 18 Ghana 14 Philippines 17 
Bangladesh 16 Guyana 12 Poland 19 
Barbados 10 Honduras 12 Portugal 16 
Belgium 19 Hungary 18 Rwanda 12 
Belize 9 Iceland 16 Senegal 11 
Bolivia 15 India 17 Sierra Leone 11 
Botswana 10 Ireland 16 Singapore 13 
Brazil 17 Italy 20 Sri Lanka 14 
Bulgaria 18 Japan 17 Swaziland 10 
Burundi 11 Luxembourg 14 Sweden 18 
Cambodia 13 Madagascar 11 Thailand 17 
Cameroon 10 Malawi 12 Trinidad and Tobago 12 
Canada 19 Mali 12 Tunisia 15 
Cent. African Rep. 7 Mauritius 24 Turkey 19 
Chad 9 Mexico 16 Uganda 13 
Chile 15 Mongolia 9 United Kingdom 20 
China 20 Mozambique 13 United States 20 
Costa Rica 12 Netherlands 19 Uruguay 14 
Cyprus 16 New Zealand 16 Zambia 12 
Denmark 18 Nicaragua 11   
Dominican Rep. 12 Niger 9 Total 1,067 
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